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DENNIS D. MURAOKA*
Managing the Sea Urchin Fishery:
An Economic Perspective
ABSTRACT
In less than two decades, the lowly sea urchin has evolved from
a destructive pest to the most valuable fish export from the State of
California. In 1988, over 49 million pounds were taken from Cali-
fornia coastal waters. About 90 percent of the processed urchins are
exported to Japan. There is concern that too many urchins are being
harvested, posing a threat to the fishery. The California legislature
voiced its concern by directing the California Department of Fish
and Game to study and report on the health of the fishery. To reduce
the annual take, California imposed a moratorium on the issuance
of new harvest permits and closed the fishery for one week each
month contingent on the size of the previous year's harvest. These
policies are economically inefficient, and they allow the economic
rent from the urchin fishery to be captured by the urchin harvesters.
To reduce the harvest in an efficient manner, a landing tax or a
transferable permitlquota system is recommended.
INTRODUCTION
Garrett Hardin penned "The Tragedy of the Commons"' in 1968. In
his article Hardin describes the problems that arise when private property
rights to a resource do not exist. In such a case, "the commons" are
treated as a free good. The inevitable result is the overexploitation and
possible destruction of the resource. Although Professor Hardin did not
mention them specifically, the rhain thrust of his argument applies to open
access fisheries like the California sea urchin fishery, which is currently
threatened by overharvesting.
As recently as 1970, sea urchins were considered a pest in California
because they damaged and sometimes destroyed the kelp beds.' Giant
kelp provides food and shelter for many fish, invertebrates (including sea
*Professor of Economics, California State University, Long Beach. The author thanks Professors
Robert T. Deacon and Walter J. Mead of the University of California, Santa Barbara and Professor
Joseph P. Magaddino of California State University, Long Beach for their helpful comments on an
earlier version of this paper.
1. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1243-48 (1968).
2. North & Pearse, Sea Urchin Population Explosion in Southern California Coastal Waters, 167
Science 209 (1970).
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urchins), and mammals, and is harvested commercially.' About 150,000
tons of kelp are taken from California waters annually.4 Processed kelp
is used in such diverse products as ice cream, beer, antibiotics, dyes, and
welding rods.5
Many suggestions had been made to control the sea urchin population
to prevent destruction of the kelp beds. In 1972, the Department of
Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service suggested harvesting and
processing sea urchins and exporting the roe to Japan where it is consid-
ered a delicacy.6 The suggestion proved profitable. By the 1980s sea
urchins had become the most valuable fishery export from California.
This paper begins with a description of the sea urchin and its habitat.
A brief historical sketch of the development of the sea urchin fishery in
the United States follows. Recent regulations designed to prevent the
overharvesting of urchins are discussed and analyzed from the perspective
of economic efficiency. Because most of the sea urchins that are exported
from the United States are taken from California coastal waters, the
analysis focuses on the policies adopted by the State of California to
protect its fishery.7 Finally, recommendations are made to improve the
efficiency of sea urchin fishery regulations.
THE SEA URCHIN AND ITS HABITAT
Sea urchins, like starfish, sea cucumbers, sea lilies, and brittle stars,
are members of the Phylum echinodermata. Echinoderm means spiny
skin. This vividly describes sea urchins with their hard, spiny shells.
Sea urchins are members of the nearshore community that surrounds
the giant kelp beds. Giant kelp is a brown algae.' It prefers shallow waters
between the depths of 20 to 60 feet. Two species of sea urchins, red and
purple sea urchin, are common in California kelp forests.9 Of these, only
the larger red sea urchin reaches sizable commercial value although small
quantities of purple urchins are now being harvested. Sea urchins grow
slowly, taking four to five years to reach the minimum commercially
harvestable size of four inches.'0
3. Kato, Sea Urchins: A New Fishery Develops in California, 34 Marine Fisheries Rev. 23 (1972).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 23-30.
7. Urchins are also harvested commercially from the coastal waters of Maine, Oregon, and
Washington.
8. The scientific name of giant kelp is Macrocystis pyrifera.
9. The scientific names of red and purple sea urchins are Strongylocentrotus franciscus and
Strongylocentrotus purpuratus, respectively.
10. Kato & Schroeter, Biology of the Red Sea Urchin, Strongylocentrotus franciscus, and Its
Fishery in California, 47 Marine Fisheries Rev. I, 8 (1985).
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THE SEA URCHIN FISHERY
Although the American commercial sea urchin fishery began in the
early 1970s, the history of the sea urchin fishery dates back several
hundred years to the era of the sea otter fur trade. Originally, sea otters
ranged along the Pacific rim from the northern Japanese islands northward
to the Aleutian islands, then south along the North American coast to
Baja California. " The sea otter has the distinction of being the only marine
mammal lacking a layer of blubber to insulate it from the cold. To maintain
body temperature, sea otters are endowed with a magnificent pelt and a
seemingly insatiable appetite. Trade in their thick, luxurious pelts led to
the otter's downfall in the nineteenth century as they were hunted to near
extinction. "
The sea otter's favorite food is shellfish, particularly sea urchin. Sea
otters eat the equivalent of 20 to 30 percent of their body weight each
day to maintain their 100 degree body temperature.' 3 At this rate an adult
will consume about 5,000 pounds of food each year. Sea otters have such
enormous appetites that they can reduce sea urchin, abalone, and other
shellfish populations below commercial levels. 4
. The elimination of the sea otter from coastal waters allowed shellfish
populations to grow. The abalone fishery boomed in the early and middle
twentieth century. The annual abalone harvest reached its peak in 1957
at over 5 million pounds per year."' "Thereafter, about 4 million pounds
were harvested annually until 1969 when a serious decline began. The
decline has continued and in some places the fishery has disappeared
altogether."' 6 By 1988, the commercial abalone harvest had declined to
only 548,583 pounds.' 7
Abalones and sea urchins compete with one another for food and
shelter. As abalone populations were depleted by sport and commercial
divers, the sea urchin population grew unchecked. In 1970, marine bi-
ologists reported more than fifty urchins per square meter in some areas.
11. The scientific name of the sea otter is Enhydra lutris.
12. Armstrong, The California Sea Otter: Emerging Conflicts in Resource Management, 16 San
Diego L. Rev. 249, 252 (1979).
13. Id. at 252.
14. See Lowery & Pearse, Abalones and Sea Urchins in an Area Inhabited by Sea Otters, 23
Marine Biology 213, 213-19 (1973); Estes & Palmisano, Sea Otters: Their Role in Restructuring
Nearshore Communities, 20 Science 1058, 1058-60 (1974); Wendell, Hardy, Ames, and Burge,
Temporal and Spatial Patterns in Sea Otter, Enhydra Lutris, Range Expansion and In the Loss of
Pismo Clam Fisheries, 72 California Fish & Game 197, 197-212 (1986).
15. P. Haaker, K. Henderson & D. Parker, Dep't of Fish & Game, State of California, Marine
Resources Leaflet No. 11, California Abalone (1986).
16. Id.
17. Only 118,087 pounds were harvested during the first three months of 1989. Dep't of Fish &
Game, State of California, California Commercial Fish Landings By Region (March 1989).
18. North & Pearse, siupra note 2.
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Ironically, today's sea urchin fishery owes its existence to excessive
harvests of two other species, the sea otter and abalone.
Several factors coalesced to make the sea urchin fishery a commercial
success in the 1970s. First, as noted above, the sea urchin population
increased to record levels in the 1960s as a result of the demise of the
sea otter and the reduction in abalone populations. Second, the advent
of commercial air freight between the United States and Japan allowed
the sea urchin, which is generally consumed raw and fresh, to be flown
to market in Japan. Third, the dollar depreciated significantly against the
Japanese yen.
From the mid-I 940s to August 197 1, the yen-dollar exchange rate was
determined by the fixed exchange rate, Bretton Woods system."' Under
the Bretton Woods system, the yen-dollar exchange rate was approxi-
mately 360 yen per dollar. In August 1971, President Nixon ended the
dollar's convertibility to gold at $35 per ounce, signaling the end of the
Bretton Woods system in favor of a system of floating exchange rates. 0
Under the floating exchange rate system, the dollar depreciated against
the yen during the 1970s.
The dollar rebounded in the early 1980s, but has since fallen sharply
to its lowest levels since World War II. During 1988, a dollar could be
exchanged for 128 yen. The yen-dollar exchange rate since 1971 is shown
in Figure 1. As the dollar depreciates relative to the yen, American goods,
including American sea urchin roe, become less expensive to the Japa-
nese.
The first commercial landings of red sea urchin recorded by the Cal-
ifornia Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) were taken off Southern
California in 1971 . The take was only 200 pounds.22 During the 1970s
the fishery grew rapidly. The harvest first exceeded 10,000,000 pounds
in 1976.3 By 1979, the harvest reached 20,000,000 pounds. The harvest
briefly peaked in 1980 and fell through 1984.24
This period of declining harvests corresponds to a period of strength
in the dollar. Since late 1984 the dollar has fallen sharply and urchin
harvests have skyrocketed. The harvest exceeded 30,000,000 pounds for
the first time in 1986, and exceeded 40,000,000 pounds for the first time
in 1987. In 1988 the harvest climbed to 49,321,468 pounds25 (see Figure
2). During the 1980s, increasing numbers of urchins have been harvested
19. For a concise description of the Bretton Woods system and the floating exhange rate system,
see C. McConnel, Economics 866-72 (10th ed., 1987).
20. Id.
21. California urchin harvests are published by the State of California, Dep't of Fish & Game,
Marine Resources Division in two reports, Annual IA Report, Catch by Species/Origin/Month
(published annually) and Commercial Fish Landings By Region (published monthly).
22. Annual Report IA (1972), supra note 21.
23. Annual Report IA (1976), supra note 21.
24. Annual Report 1A (1979 through 1984), supra note 21.
25. Commercial Fish Landings by Region (Dec. 1986, Dec. 1987 and Dec. 1988), supra note
21.
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from the colder waters of northern California. David Parker, Marine
Biologist for CDFG Marine Resources Branch, describes the meteoric
growth in the harvest as "the typical 'gold rush' situation."'26
Divers harvest urchins one at a time. They dislodge sea urchins from
the ocean bottom with short-handled rakes and scoop them into large
mesh bags. Because the urchins are selected individually, only the larger,
commercially valuable specimens need be taken. An inflatable rubber
tube is attached to the mesh bags. It is filled with air, floating the bag to
the surface, as the bag reaches its capacity. Urchin divers typically work
for only three to four hours per day because of the cold.27 In that short
time span, each diver harvests about 2,000 to 2,200 pounds of urchins.2"
Once harvested, the urchins are brought to shore and sold to processing
plants. At the plants, the urchin shell is split and the urchin's orange sex
organs are removed and cleaned. The urchin's sex organs are euphemis-
tically called "roe" or "uni." They are the edible portion of the urchin
and constitute 5 to 10 percent of the sea urchin's weight.29 The highest
quality roe is packed in wooden trays and flown to Japan. Each tray
contains 8 to 9 ounces of uni. The best quality roe recently sold for as
much as $63.00 per tray wholesale.30 Lower quality roe is used in salted
and cooked products.3
The rapid growth of the urchin harvest has caused concern over the
long term health of the fishery. One California diver wrote:
The sea urchin harvesting industry in Northern California is gravely
imperiled ... by unsustainable and rapidly escalating rates of har-
vesting. Forceful and rapid action by the Department of Fish and
Game is required to protect the long-term viability of the urchin
resource .... The resource is being destroyed now, not in the future.
In the future, there may be little left to destroy--or to save. 2
Several protective measures have been suggested, including: (a) a pro-
hibition on harvesting young urchins less than three inches in size, (b) a
limit on the number of divers, (c) a limit on the amount of urchin each
diver may harvest, (d) a fishing season for urchins, (e) closure of fishery
areas, and (f) an increase in the sea urchin landing tax. The California
legislature considered these suggestions and passed legislation imple-
26. D. Parker quoted in Stein, Urchin Message: State Petitioned to Set Harvesting Rules as Spiny
Shellfish Gains Popularity as Food, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 10, 1987, at 3.
27. Kato & Schroeter, supra note 10, at 10.
28. Id.
29. Stein, supra note 26.
30. Chipello, A Miracle in Maine: Sea Urchin is Turned to Golden Uni, The Wall Street Journal,
Mar. 18, 1988, at 1.
31. For a complete description of sea urchin processing, see Kato & Schroeter, supra note 10,
at 12-17.
32. Stein, supra note 26.
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menting several of them. Current measures affecting the fishery are de-
scribed below.33 In addition to these measures, the legislature directed
CDFG to study the fishery and report on its well-being by January 1,
1991.34
CURRENT REGULATIONS AND TAXES
California currently regulates the urchin harvest by issuing permits,
collecting a landing tax, limiting the fishing season, and restricting harvest
methods.
Permits
Before 1985 anyone was allowed to harvest urchins. Since 1986, CDFG
requires an annual permit to take urchins.35 The permit is valid from April
1 to March 31 of the following year and cannot be transferred.36 Its price
was increased from a nominal $25.00 per year to $250 per year in 1987."
By 1987, 737 divers held permits.3" A moratorium was imposed in 1987
on the issuance of new permits by the California State Legislature to
restrict the number of divers harvesting urchins.39 Only those persons
holding 1986-87 permits were eligible to obtain 1987-88 permits. Sim-
ilarly, a 1987-88 permit was required to obtain a 1988-89 permit. Unless
extended by CDFG, the moratorium on the issuance of new permits will
expire in 1989.'
Landing Tax on the Urchin Harvest
California levies a tax of $0.0013 per pound on the sea urchin harvest.4
A surtax of $0.005 per pound has been imposed on the urchin take. 2 The
surtax will remain in effect until January 1, 1991 or until the revenue
from the fee has reached $300,000, whichever comes first.43 The funds
raised by the temporary tax will be used by CDFG to study and enhance
the sea urchin fishery.'
33. See infra text accompanying notes 35-47.
34. Cal. Fish & Game Code § 9056 (West 1989).
35. Cal. Admin. Code, tit, 14, § 120.7a (1987).
36. Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 120.7(4)(b) (1987).
37. Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 120.7(4)(d) (1987).
38. Hauser, Urchin Harvest Worries Divers, Santa Barbara News Press, Apr. 15, 1987, at BI.
39. Cal. Admin. Code, fit. 14, § 120.7(4) (1987).
40. 1d.
41. Cal. Fish & Game Code § 805 1(a) (West 1989).
42. Cal. Fish & Game Code § 8051.1 (a) (West 1989).
43. Cal. Fish & Game Code § 8051.1(c) (West 1989).
44. Cal. Fish & Game Code § 8051.2 (West 1989).
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Limiting the Fishing Season
The fishing season for sea urchins is currently restricted contingent on
the previous year's harvest.45 If the harvest in the previous calendar year
exceeds 10,000,000 pounds in Northern California (north of the Mon-
terey-San Luis Obispo County line) or exceeds 18,000,000 pounds in
Southern California, divers will be prohibited from taking urchins one
week each month from May through September. This restriction was
imposed for the first time in 1988.
Other Regulations
Rakes, airlifts, or other handheld appliances may be used to harvest
sea urchins. However, divers may not disturb "rocks or other mineral
materials, aquatic plants, fish or other aquatic life" while harvesting
urchins." In particular, divers harvesting urchins cannot concomitantly
harvest lobsters or abalone.47
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CURRENT REGULATIONS AND TAXES
The Economic Meaning of Resource Conservation
Before analyzing the regulations and taxes governing the sea urchin
fishery, the criteria by which they will be judged must be defined. Econ-
omists widely agree that fisheries and other natural resources should be
managed to maximize the value of the economic rent that can be derived
from the resource.4" Economic rent is the difference between the dis-
counted revenue that can be derived from a resource and the discounted
opportunity cost incurred in deriving this revenue. Maximizing the eco-
nomic rent from a resource is the economic definition of resource con-
servation. Within the economics profession it is also called economic
efficiency or Pareto optimality. Wasteful policies reduce the net present
value of the economic rent from a natural resource.
Under special circumstances private markets conserve resources. A
necessary condition for markets to conserve resources is that all market
participants bear the full opportunity cost of their actions.49 Unfortunately,
this does not happen in open access fisheries like the sea urchin fishery.
Although the urchin harvesters bear the capital costs associated with the
urchin harvest equipment, and the labor costs associated with employing
45. Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 120.7(4)(i) (1987).
46. Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 120.7(4)(f)(2) (1987).
47. Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 120.7(4)(f)(1) (1987).
48. See Crutchfield, Economic Objectives of Fishery Management, in The Fisheries: Problems
in Resource Management 43, 45-46 (J. A. Crutchfield ed. 1965).
49. The opportunity cost of an activity is the value of what must be foregone to undertake the
activity.
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divers, they do not bear the cost of depleting the urchin population. This
cost is borne by society as a whole. To maximize economic rent, the
urchin depletion cost must be taken into account. This situation is shown
in Figure 3.
Private harvesters in an open access fishery seek to maximize profits.
In so doing they consider only their private costs. They will harvest an
additional pound of sea urchins as long as the additional revenue derived
from the harvested urchins (or marginal revenue) exceeds the additional
cost of harvesting the urchins (or marginal cost). For the urchin fishery,
which is comprised of many small harvesters and consumers, no indi-
vidual market participant can alter the market price of urchins. All par-
ticipants accept the market price as something that is beyond their control
and take those actions to maximize their well being given this fact. It
follows that the marginal revenue for urchin harvesters is the current
market price of urchins. Profit maximization occurs at the level of harvest,
U1, where marginal revenue equals private marginal cost.
The profit-maximizing harvest does not conserve resources. In order
for economic rent to be maximized, the cost of depleting the urchin
population must also be considered. The rent-maximizing harvest, U2,
is found by equating the sea urchin price (a measure of the marginal
benefit of sea urchins) with the social marginal cost (the private marginal
cost plus the cost of depleting the urchin population).
Social Marginal Cost
Private Marginal Cost
Price = Marginal Revenue
U2 U1
Urchin Harvest
FIGURE 3. Private and Social Optimal Harvest.
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Strategies to Reduce Harvest
Various strategies have been used to reduce the take from open access
fisheries. These include taxes, subsidies, and a variety of regulations
including restricting the fishing season, the number of harvesters, the
fishing gear, and the size of the catch.
The annual, non-transferable permit used in the urchin fishery reduces
the harvest by restricting the number of divers. Although this reduces the
harvest, it does not do so efficiently. When economic rent is maximized,
the divers who can take urchins at the lowest cost harvest the urchins.
By only allowing divers with existing permits to acquire a permit, and
by not allowing permits to be transferred among divers, the low cost
harvesters may not be allowed to harvest urchins. This result would be
avoided if divers were allowed to transfer permits among themselves. If
a new, more efficient diver wanted to enter the fishery, he would be able
to purchase a permit from a less efficient diver. Less efficient divers would
willingly sell their permits because the more efficient diver would pay
more for the permits than the less efficient divers could earn by keeping
them. If the permits were transferable, the economic rent from the fishery
would accrue to the original owners of the permits.
Urchin harvesters favor fixing the number of non-transferable permits
because (a) it reduces the harvest, and (b) it keeps potential competitors
from entering the fishery. The reduced harvest decreases urchin supply,
driving up urchin prices and profits. Increased profits attract individuals
to the industry. However, the current system creates and protects mo-
nopoly power for divers currently harvesting urchins by prohibiting entry.
Although the urchin landing tax is intended solely to raise revenue, it
could be used like the permit system to reduce the harvest. Furthermore,
taxes on catch are economically efficient if the tax is equated with the
cost of depleting the urchin resource that would not otherwise be born
by urchin harvesters. This situation is shown in Figure 4. As discussed
earlier, private firms will harvest U1 urchins. Suppose that the optimal
harvest is U2. This could be achieved by imposing a tax of t dollars per
pound of urchin harvested. The harvesters perceive the tax as an increase
in their marginal cost and reduce the harvest so that their perceived
marginal cost (the private marginal cost plus t) is equated to their marginal
revenue. Such a tax would not be popular among urchin harvesters be-
cause it would require divers to pay for an input, the urchin capital stock,
that was previously available at no charge. The tax should be considered
nonetheless, because it is economically efficient and raises revenue for
the government (in Figure 4, the amount of the tax, U2 multiplied by t,
is the area of the shaded rectangle).
Like taxation, prohibiting harvests one week each month, imposing
gear restrictions, and disallowing joint harvests of urchins with other
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Private Marginal Cost + t
Private Marginal Cost
I-._/ Price = Marginal Revenue
t
U2 Ul
Urchin Harvest
FIGURE 4. The Effect of Landing Tax on Harvest.
shellfish will reduce the urchin harvest, but are inefficient. Economic
efficiency requires that the harvest be maintained at optimal levels, but
that this harvest be accomplished at the minimum cost. The regulations
described above reduce the harvest by increasing the cost of fishing.
Divers are not allowed to harvest urchins at a time and with a mix of
inputs that is most productive. Economic efficiency requires that urchin
divers bear the full costs of their actions. These include the cost of
depleting the urchin population and the cost associated with damaging
the ocean bottom which gear restrictions are intended in part to prevent.
However, regulations which result in unnecessary costs waste rather than
conserve resources.
A MARKET-BASED ALTERNATIVE
A market-based solution may solve the problem of excessive harvests.
Over-harvesting occurs because the fishery is common property. A so-
lution to the problem is to create private property rights to the fishery.
Private rights may be created by implementing a system of transferable
permit/quotas. The permit/quotas would differ significantly from existing
permits. Under current regulations, a diver must possess a permit to
harvest urchins. The permit allows the diver to take an unlimited number
of urchins. Under the alternative scheme, divers would possess a permit/
quota (hereinafter "permit") to harvest urchins which would entitle its
owner to a fixed quantity of urchins.
Winter 19901
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For example, suppose that CDFG determines that the annual urchin
take should be limited to 20 million pounds each year. This catch could
be achieved by issuing 4,000 permits each year; each permit would entitle
its holder to take 5,000 pounds of urchins. Divers would be allowed to
acquire as many permits as they desire subject to the overall limit. The
permits would be fully transferable. Each day, when the divers bring their
catch to shore, the catch would be weighed, and the catch allowed by
the permit would be reduced accordingly. When the allowed catch is
reduced to zero, the permit expires.
Permits would be sold by the government to the highest bidder. An
auction would allocate permits efficiently because the divers that can
generate the greatest value from each permit would submit the largest
bids. By selling the permits to the highest bidder, the economic rent from
the fishery accrues to the government.
The system also has the virtue that it would allow the government to
adjust the overall size of the catch by buying or selling permits. Calcu-
lating the allowable harvest may be difficult. Furthermore, the optimal
level of harvest may change over time. The transferable permit system
would enable the government to adjust the allowed catch if errors occur
or when adjustment becomes necessary due to changes in other conditions.
A disadvantage of a transferable permit system in which the permits
are auctioned by the government is that it would be politically unpopular
with the divers. As with an efficient landing tax, the auctioned permit
system would require harvesters to pay for the use of the urchin capital
stock. One way of placating divers may be to give the permits to divers
currently holding permits rather than auction the permits to the highest
bidder. As long as the permits are transferable, the method by which the
government initially allocates the permits will have no bearing on their
efficiency. The method of allocation by the government does, however,
determine who will receive the economic rent from the fishery. By auc-
tioning the permits to the highest bidder, the government collects the
economic rent. By giving the permits to divers, the divers receive the
economic rent from the resource. This alternative is undoubtedly preferred
by the divers currently harvesting urchins.
Positive economic theory can provide no guidance as to which of these
allocation schemes is preferred. This is an income distribution issue. Such
a system would be efficient even if the permits were given away at no
charge if the permits are transferable.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From its inception in the early 1970s, the American sea urchin fishery
skyrocketed. The growth rate has been so dramatic that concern exists
over the long term well-being of the fishery.
[Vol. 30
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The California legislature voiced its concern by directing the CDFG
to report on the health of the California sea urchin fishery by 1991. The
State of California has also imposed a temporary moratorium on the
issuance of urchin harvest permits, placed gear restrictions on harvesters,
prohibited joint harvesting of sea urchins and other shellfish, restricted
the fishing season contingent on the previous year's take, and levied a
temporary landing tax on urchin harvests. The first four policies reduce
harvests. The tax raises revenue.
Although the policies devised to reduce harvests should have the in-
tended effect, they are inefficient because they do not achieve their harvest
reductions at the minimum cost. If economic efficiency is the criterion
by which these policies are to be evaluated, they should be discontinued.
A landing tax could be used instead to reduce harvests efficiently, if the
tax rate is set appropriately.
An alternative, efficient method of reducing harvests is a transferable
permit/quota system. If a limited number of permits are auctioned by the
government to the highest bidders, the system would have the additional
benefit of allocating the economic rent from the fishery to the government.
Despite its desirable resource conservation aspects, the transferable per-
mit/quota system would probably meet with resistance from divers. It
would be less preferred by divers to policies like the existing non-trans-
ferable permit system because it would be more costly to divers. A trans-
ferable permit/quota system is, however, worth pursuing because it protects
the renewable urchin resource while enhancing the value of the fishery.
By creating property rights to the urchin resource, a "tragedy of the
commons" can be averted.
Winter 19901
